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This thesis examines the history of anti-Americanism as both a passing sentiment 
and an enduring ideology and how both can be detrimental to American security and 
future prosperity. It further explores the analytical methods for studying anti-
Americanism, to include classic polling and social media analysis in an attempt to 
determine the reliability of each. This work attempts to bring to light the underlying 
motives for anti-American beliefs by examining relationships between explicit American 
actions in Pakistan and Japan and variations in anti-American sentiment. The results 
show that drone strikes in Pakistan and large-scale military exercises involving U.S. and 
Japanese forces both can cause significant fluctuations in the number of positive and 
negative tweets directed toward America. I argue that the mixed and negative messages 
represented in Twitter are due in a large part to a lack of U.S. transparency while 
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A giant hurdle to American ventures and successes in the international arena lies 
in convincing the world that America’s actions and ambitions are well-intentioned and 
just. According to Tod Lindberg and Suzanne Nossel of the Princeton Project on National 
Security, the effects of anti-American sentiment are critically important for three reasons:  
1. Anti-Americanism can foment terrorism and violence toward the United States. 
2. It can harm U.S. commercial interests abroad. 
3. It can create difficulties in rallying support for specific U.S. policy objectives.1  
The United States will find it difficult to counter an anti-American attitude unless 
it can determine why this attitude exists in the first place and what specific events erode 
the American reputation.  
This study examines the anti-American sentiment that forms following specific 
events in the countries of Pakistan and Japan, countries with relevant and increasing 
Twitter use. In doing so, this research seeks to fill the gap in information flow that is 
inherent to polling procedures, caused by a lag time in the questions posed and the results 
reported. Social media analysis, specifically Twitter analysis, may be able to tighten this 
gap and provide near-real-time data for those who can properly analyze the massive 
amounts of data. 
The Pakistan case study examines the relationship between drone strikes and anti-
American sentiment. The Japanese case study explores how large bilateral or multilateral 
military exercises with both U.S. and Japanese participants are perceived by the Japanese 
populace. In both cases, the approach combines information from secondary sources, 
traditional polling, and metrics derived through the analysis of Twitter messages. 
 
                                                 
 1 Todd Lindberg and Suzanne Nossel, “Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism,” 
Princeton Project on National Security, 2007, accessed 19 January, 2016, https://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/
conferences/reports/fall/aa_exec.pdf. 
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Given the importance of the issue, it seeks to answer the following questions:  
1. Is it possible to gauge a near-real-time change in anti-American sentiment 
through social media analysis?  
2. What U.S. actions or policies result in significant anti-American 
sentiment?  
This thesis hypothesizes that social media analysis, specifically analysis of 
messages sent through the Twitter network, can be used to gauge the overall sentiment of 
a group of people or region of the world, and how that sentiment changes in response to 
American actions. To test this hypothesis, it will examine whether it is possible to 
observe a relationship between the number of tweets with a positive or negative 
sentiment in a particular region and the occurrence of an American drone strike or large 
military exercise. It also hypothesizes that American action or policies, which give rise to 
Katzenstein and Keohane’s subset of “sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism,” will 
generate the biggest fluctuation in anti-American sentiment.2 These include events such 
as military occupations, large movements of American troops to an area, deaths at the 
hands of the American government or military, and passage of foreign policies that 
specifically target rights or interests of foreign countries.  
The data from the case study on drone strikes in Pakistan suggests that drone 
strikes result in an increase in the salience of the category “America” in local social 
media messages. This higher volume of messages referencing “America” continues even 
one month following a drone strike. Further analysis shows that there is strong correlation 
between drone strikes in Pakistan and messages that combine the category of “America” 
with terms indicating negative sentiment, even after controlling for the overall volume of 
messages referencing “America.” This phenomenon occurs immediately following a 
drone strike and becomes even more pronounced seven days following a drone strike. 
Anti-American sentiment, as evidenced through the Pakistani Twittersphere, rises with 
the advent of a drone strike despite the intent of the United States, despite the number of 
                                                 
 2 Neil Gross, “The Many Stripes of Anti-Americanism: Sociologists Find that Anti-American 
Sentiment Is More Varied and Less Widespread than You Might Think,” Boston Globe, January 14, 2007, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/405055416?accountid=12702, 2. 
 xvii 
terrorists killed, despite the U.S.-Pakistani alliance, and despite the attempts of the 
Pakistani government to inform the populace of the underlying motives.  
The data from the case study on U.S.-Japanese joint exercises reveals that an 
increased salience of “America” terms appears in the Japanese Twittersphere seven days 
following an exercise and then drops off after 30 days. Further, there is a strong 
relationship between the occurrence of an exercise and the number of negative “America” 
tweets. Moreover, when these joint exercises occur on Japanese soil, the number of 
“negative America” tweets increases immediately following an exercise and then 
significantly decreases after a 30-day period. Regardless of where the exercise takes 
place, results show that Japanese locals increase their “negative America” tweets the 
longer it has been since the exercise’s start. The initial benefit that the community might 
reap in the beginning of an exercise can soon turn sour as the Japanese dwell on the fact 
that America still has a heavy hand over them with limitations on their military power.  
  
 xviii 
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The superpower status of the United States has manifested itself in the form of 
economic growth, technological innovation, intellectual achievements, and military 
dominance. The military arm of the United States has a presence all over the world, and 
both open arms and scorn greet this presence. This study examines the anti-American 
sentiment that forms following specific events in the countries of Pakistan and Japan, 
countries with relevant and increasing amounts of Twitter use. There is a large variation 
in the pro-American tendencies of each country, which will add further strength to the 
presence of certain sentiments in Twitter. In Pakistan, this study examines the association 
between drone strikes and anti-American sentiment. In Japan, it looks at how the 
Japanese populace perceives large bilateral or multilateral military exercises with both 
U.S. and Japanese participants.  
The U.S. will find it difficult to counter an anti-American attitude unless it can 
determine why this attitude exists in the first place and what specific events erode the 
status of American legitimacy. Anti-Americanism studies of the past have relied on a 
series of reputable polls and surveys, such as Pew and Gallup, to gather data. Although 
comprehensive in nature and diligent in methodology, these resources take considerable 
time to compile. Unfortunately, opinions during the time of compilation can change and 
cannot be explicitly associated with specific events unless the polls can be arranged in 
advance. However, the new wave of web analytics gives users near-real-time data that 
can be directly correlated to events in time and space. Correlating specific events to 
increases or decreases in American sentiment, as perceived through Twitter messages, 






A. THE PROBLEM WITH ANTI-AMERICANISM 
American psychologist Fathali Moghaddam has argued that there is a “narrowing 
staircase to terrorism.”1 According to Moghaddam, most individuals with grievances 
remain on the ground floor, even when they feel their voices fall on deaf ears or there is 
no outlet for their frustration. Yet others will attach themselves to an ideology or 
sentiment such as anti-Americanism, change their thought process on the morality of 
their actions, and ultimately become terrorist recruits climbing up the staircase to conduct 
terrorist acts.2 Moghaddam argues that governments worldwide need to stop would-be 
terrorists on the ground floor, before the desire to climb the staircase is seeded. One 
solution for solving Moghaddam’s problem of ideological terrorism lies in soft power. 
Joseph Nye first coined the term “soft power,” defining it as “when one country gets 
other countries to want what it wants…in contrast with the hard or command power or 
ordering others to do what it wants.”3 Anthony Pratkanis, further refines this notion as 
“seeking to promote the interests of the United States through attraction as opposed to 
coercion.”4 Pratkanis argues that we can stand behind American attractiveness through 
popular culture, political ideals, and a positive world policy.5 Thus, if the U.S. State 
Department (DoS) and DOD could accurately predict what will appear popular in foreign 
theaters, it is plausible the U.S. could bolster the projection of U.S. soft power.  
According to Tod Lindberg and Suzanne Nossel of the Princeton Project on 




                                                 
1 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2 (February–March 2005), 162.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Joseph Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80, 20th anniversary (Autumn 1990): 166, 
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-27/Nye%201990.pdf. 
4 Anthony Pratkanis, “Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis,” in Information 
Strategy and Warfare, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 56. 
5 Ibid. 
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1. Anti-Americanism can foment terrorism and violence toward the United 
States. 
2. It can harm U.S. commercial interests abroad. 
3. It can create difficulties in rallying support for specific U.S. policy 
objectives.6  
Reducing anti-American sentiment abroad may not only increase security for 
soldiers and executives operating around the world, but could greatly affect the efficiency 
of foreign interactions at the strategic and tactical level. Lindberg and Nossel argue that 
the U.S. government should create a new office to combat this sentiment. In contrast, I 
argue that U.S. military forces are already in place to act as stewards to meet this 
requirement not only during Phase 0 (prepare/prevent) of the military campaign process 
but in Phase IV (establish security/restore services) and Phase V (transfer to civil 
authority) as well.7  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the importance of the issue, in this thesis I intend to answer the following 
questions:  
1. 1. Is it possible to gauge a near-real-time change in anti-American 
sentiment through social media analysis?  
2. 2. Which forms of U.S. military action result in the largest change in anti-
American sentiment?  
C. HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1: Social media analysis, specifically Twitter analysis, can be used to 
gauge the overall sentiment of a group of people or region of the world in response to 
American military actions, as evidenced by increases in relative volumes of messages 
referencing the category of “America” and “negative America” sentiments.  
 
                                                 
 6 Lindberg and Nossel, “Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism.” 
 7 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Defense Technical 
Information Center, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm. 
 4 
Hypothesis 2: American action or policies that fit into Katzenstein and Keohane’s 
subset of “sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism” probably generate the widest 
variation in anti-American sentiment.8 Events that fall under this subset would include 
military occupations, large influxes of American troops to an area, death at the hands of 
the American government or military, and passage of foreign policies that specifically 
target rights or interests of foreign countries.  
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In an attempt to understand the basis of anti-American sentiment in the world, this 
thesis will seek to measure sentiment through opinion polls and a social media analysis of 
an archival source of Twitter feeds. Through social media analysis or “Twitter scraping,” 
it will search for a relationship between specific actions carried out by the U.S. and 
subsequent increases or a decreases in anti-American sentiment. The analysis will then 
explore the attributes of a positive event to determine how to harness these factors to 
recreate such sentiment. Additionally, it will explore which negative factors could be 
eradicated in an attempt to decrease negative sentiment.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
Katzenstein and Keohane assert that the degree of anti-Americanism changes with 
time in the eyes of those who harbor it.9 Consequently, it is difficult to pinpoint the 
dynamics of anti-American sentiment using a survey that takes a long time to field and 
compile. To begin to fill this gap which resides in the need for near-real time data, this 
thesis will utilize social media outlets to gauge international and political sentiment as a 
method for acquiring actionable intelligence. By accessing the abundance of big data on 
social media sites such as Twitter, it may be possible to assess user sentiment to attain 
near-real-time data on various topics. As this technology progresses, one could imagine 
an essentially live pulse on what actions or policies create a rise or decline in anti-
American sentiment.  
                                                 
8 Gross, “The Many Stripes of Anti-Americanism,” 2. 
9 Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 78. 
 5 
By utilizing sentiment analysis, I seek to associate word usage with specific 
events involving the United States in order to gauge an increase or decrease in anti-
American sentiment. As a primary methodology, I will apply this approach to two case 
studies — one in the country of Pakistan and one in the country of Japan. In order to 
narrow the geographic scope of my research, I selected two countries where anti-
American sentiment had shown signs of existence in the past, and which continue to see 
divided opinions to this day. As indicated by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes 
Project, Pakistan had a 59% unfavorable rating of the U.S. in 2014, while Japan had a 
66% favorable rating of the U.S. in the same year.10 Moreover, while Twitter use is 
clearly quite high in Japan, use of Twitter in Pakistan has also been increasing and it now 
penetrates over one percent of the Pakistani population at over 200 million users,11 and 
contributes one percent of the world Twitter users.12 
For both case studies, I used an archival database of tweets licensed for use by 
NPS, recording nearly 12 billion Twitter messages (“tweets”) sent through the Twitter 
network between August 1, 2013, and July 31, 2014.13 Drawing on a well-tested 
sentiment dictionary known as the Harvard General Inquirer dictionary, I sorted Tweets 
into three categories of positive, negative, and hostile. I then drew on multivariate 
regression analysis in order to examine the fluctuation in the number of tweets associated 
with negative and positive sentiment towards “America,” and to assess their relationships 
to specific actions carried out by the U.S. military in these two countries.  
For the country of Pakistan, I utilized a database published by the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, a nonprofit organization. Their Covert Drone War database 
records documented U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. For Pakistan in 
                                                 
10 “U.S. Favorability,” Pew Research Center, July 11, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/
global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/pg-2014-07-14-
balance-of-power-1-02/. 
11 Saeed, Ahsan. "Twitter Landscape Of Pakistan – First Edition." Twittistaan. Last modified February 
5, 2014. http://twittistaan.com/digital-media/infographics/twitter-landscape-of-pakistan-first-edition/. 
12 “Pakistan Needs to Tweet More,” DAWN, July 7, 2011, http://www.dawn.com/news/642962/
pakistan-needs-to-tweet-more. 
 13 T. Camber Warren, “Mapping the Rhetoric of Violence: Political Conflict Discourse and the 
Emergence of Identity Radicalization in Nigerian Social Media,” Department of Defense Analysis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2015.  
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particular, the bureau has collected data on drone strikes since 2004 and has kept a 
cumulative spreadsheet of these strikes.14 For my analysis, I chose to examine a series of 
17 drone strikes, all of which are well documented by various media sources. My dataset 
included the date and time of the drone strikes, the location of the drone strikes, the 
number of total people killed, and the number of civilians killed.  
To compile data for the Japanese case study, I reached out to the U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM) Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), and the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Office (MDAO) in Tokyo, Japan. I queried these organizations for a list of all 
large-scale bilateral or multilateral exercises that the U.S. military had participated in 
with the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) during the timeframe coinciding with the 
Twitter archival database. With their help I compiled a list of 10 large-scale exercises that 
occurred on a regular basis and involved soldiers from the U.S. military and the JSDF.15 
The database I compiled for the Japanese case study included exercise location, timing, 
and the number of U.S. and Japanese participants for each exercise.  
 
                                                 
14 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Get the Data: Drone Wars Archives,” accessed January 19, 
2016, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/. 
15 The regularity of their occurrence contributed to their notoriety in the local Japanese communities. 
 7 
II. DEFINING ANTI-AMERICANISM 
A. WORD USAGE AND HISTORY 
Theories about anti-Americanism have been around since the 18th century. Even 
as the United States was being formed, so too was forming the sentiment that America 
was different, a mix of cultures, and an entity to contend with. Similarly, the research on 
the theory of anti-Americanism has deep roots, although a recent resurgence or interest 
arose in the wake of U.S. polices following 9/11. As Justin Webb writes, anti-
Americanism was a state of mind that really struck deep within Europe during the 18th 
century. Scientists and explorers sent to the United States reported  it as a dump and 
“struck with putrefaction.”16Anecdotal references and opinion pieces provided evidence 
of this concept initially, but recently the study has given rise to extensive polling, 
surveying, and deep-rooted sociological studies. It has been noted that the theory of anti-
Americanism changes with time in the eyes of those who harbor it. Katzenstein and 
Keohane define it as “a psychological tendency to hold negative views on the United 
States, and of American society in general.”17 Comparatively, Webb argues that the 
theories on anti-Americanism are torn between those who believe it is a state of mind, 
born by grievances and prejudices from the past, and those who interpret it as an 
“empirical reaction” to American policy.18  
Paul Hollander, an American political sociologist from Princeton, does his best to 
sum up the current range of theories on anti-Americanism in his piece Pride and 
Prejudice. He describes the variety of works on the subject as ranging from “pure and 
visceral,” as in Jean Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism, to those pieces that refute 
these claims, such as Jean-François Revel’s book Anti-Americanism.19 In the middle lie 
theories that explain what has incited anti-Americanism in the past, such as Clyde 
                                                 
16 Justin Webb, “Those Who Hate the U.S. Actually Hate Themselves,” Times, October 30, 2015, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1728216896?accountid=12702. 
17 Katzenstein and Keohane, Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, 12. 
18 Webb, “Those Who Hate the U.S.,” 1. 
19 Paul Hollander, “Pride and Prejudice,” National Interest, no. 77 (Fall 2004): 134–141, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/218402821?accountid=12702. 
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Prestowitz’s Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, 
which discusses how the Bush administration fed this ideology, and Alan McPherson’s 
Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations.20 Although sometimes 
lumped into the term anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism has different connotations, and 
Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit address these differences in Occidentalism: The West 
in the Eyes of Its Enemies.21 
B. HYPOTHESIZED CAUSES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM 
Many authors have attempted to explain the causes of this sentiment. Andrew 
Kohut and Bruce Stokes set out to answer this question in their 2006 book America 
against the World. Drawing on various polls conducted in 2005 and 2006, their 
conclusions surrounding the roots of anti-Americanism in the world can be boiled down 
to five factors: American exceptionalism, American nationalism, American religiosity, 
unilateralism, and overwhelming optimism.22  
American exceptionalism refers to the fact that America is the world superpower 
and American business and cultural exports amplify the differences in attitudes or values 
between the United States and other nation-states. American nationalism is evident in 
American flags being displayed proudly outside American houses; it is evident in the 
medal count of every Olympic games held to date; it is evident in the majority of 
Americans who will not hesitate to tell you of their American origins. As Kohut and 
Stokes point out, “compared with Western Europeans, average Americans are more likely 
to express their pride and patriotism.”23 
Religion often plays a role in anti-Americanism, and foreigners perceive religious 
agendas as driving American leaders. President George Bush’s often moralistic rhetoric 
following 9/11 and the longstanding U.S. support for Israel often drive the religious 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 1. 
21 Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies (New York: 
Penguin, 2005), 11. 
22 Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America against the World: How We Are Different and Why We 
Are Disliked (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006). 
23 Kohut and Stokes, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism,” Pew Research Center, May 9, 
2006, http://www.pewresearch.org/2006/05/09/the-problem-of-american-exceptionalism, 2. 
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dagger into the side of Muslim nation-states. American unilateral tendencies further this 
divide. According to Pew polls, Americans feel their nation does not need international or 
United Nations (UN) support before taking military action to defend itself. Polls 
consistently point to the public disapproval of American troops serving under UN 
command or under trial in international courts.24  
The final basis for anti-Americanism identified by Kohut and Stokes is American 
overconfidence. The Pew 1999 Millennium Survey found that many of the people 
surveyed expected an onslaught of gloom in the near future, to include California 
earthquakes, global warming, terror attacks, and energy crises. Despite the visions of 
gloom, these same Americans felt extremely optimistic about the future of the nation, to 
include a cure for cancer and AIDS, an improved environment, and men on Mars.25 
Nevertheless, in a 2005 17-nation poll done by Pew, 69% of surveyed Americans felt the 
United States was “generally disliked” by foreigners and 70% described their fellow 
Americans as greedy.26  
C. VARIETIES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM 
According to Robert Keohane and Peter Katzenstein in their book Anti-
Americanisms in World Politics, anti-Americanism is not a single notion, but rather a 
framework that includes six distinct types.27 They offer a complete typology to the theory 
of anti-Americanism. They distinguish the passing sentiment of simple thoughts and 
reactions from the deeper ideology that brings radical anti-American supporters to 
conduct extreme terrorist acts.28 The typology consists of six forms of anti-Americanism 
that stem from varying grievances against the United States. The first is liberal anti-
Americanism, in which supporters are frustrated with American hypocrisy and failure to 
live up to expected ideals.29 An example would be the U.S. intervention in Somalia but 
lack of intervention in Rwanda. The second form of anti-Americanism is the notion of 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 6. 
25 Ibid., 8. 
26 Ibid., 6. 
27 Gross, “The Many Stripes of Anti-Americanism,” 1. 
28 Lindberg and Nossel, “Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism.”  
29 Gross, “The Many Stripes of Anti-Americanism,” 2. 
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“social anti-Americanism,” which opposes “American economic policy because it 
promotes laissez-faire ideals and erodes welfare state protections.”30 The third, the 
sovereign-nationalist view, sees America as posing a threat to another country’s 
fundamental interests or existence.31 Lindberg and Nossel offer the example of how 
China and Germany may view U.S. action on or near their homelands as aggression.32  
The fourth view, radical anti-Americanism, expresses the need to reform the 
United States completely, often for religious reasons. This is viewed as legitimizing the 
use of suicide bombs and other terrorist acts in attempts to physically alter the American 
presence abroad.33 In the fifth view, cultural-elitist anti-American thinkers view the 
American culture as unrefined. They feel that America is inferior in class to their own 
country and often look upon Americans with disdain, as with the cultural anti-
Americanism in the intellectual community of the French.34 Finally, in the sixth view, 
legacy anti-Americanism, the populace is bitter over historical wrongs that have 
manifested themselves most recently in current events. In one example, Mexico feels the 
United States has taken advantage of their country regarding land governance, trade, and 
border restrictions.35 Other Latin American countries harbor similar legacy anti-
Americanism sentiment stemming from U.S. covert military interventions, neo-liberal 
economic reforms supported by the U.S. government, and political backings of politicians 
for U.S. interests.36 The current unilateralism of the United States and its “hegemonic” 
stance on various political, economic, and immigration issues can reheat past Latin 
American grievances that have lain dormant for some time.37  
The study of Long, Bunch, and Lloyd appears to draw parallels to Katzenstein 
and Keohane’s typology of anti-Americanism. Their approach to measuring anti-
                                                 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Lindberg and Nossel, “Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism,” 9. 
33 Gross, “The Many Stripes of Anti-Americanism,” 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Justin Lance, “Populism and Anti-Americanism in Modern Latin America,” Origins 1, no. 1 
(October 1, 2007): 4, http://origins.osu.edu/article/populism-and-anti-americanism-modern-latin-america. 
37 Ibid., 5. 
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Americanism is unique, as they look at editorial cartoons in both English and Spanish and 
analyze the sentiment under a statistical lens. Long et al. groups the studies of anti-
Americanism into three tracks: The first equates the sentiment to the likes of misogyny or 
anti-Semitism.38 This appears similar to Katzenstein and Keohane’s radical and legacy 
anti-Americanism. The second track maintains a disdain for U.S. policy decisions and 
foreign policy. This incorporates Katzenstein and Keohane’s liberal, social, and 
sovereign-nationalist theories on anti-Americanism. Finally, the third track of anti-
Americanism, according to Long, Bunch, and Lloyd, comes as a response to U.S. 
modernization from the 19th century onward.39 This draws parallels to Katzenstein and 
Keohane’s elitist and legacy anti-Americanism subsets. There exist parallels that can be 
seen between Long, Bunch, and Lloyd’s typology and Katzenstein and Keohane’s 
typology as depicted in Table 1. The table depicts the diversification in the semantics 
regarding anti-Americanism. It also helps one visualize the overlap that can exist 
amongst individuals with similar views on the subject such as Katzenstein and Keohane 
and Long, Bunch, and Lloyd.  
Table 1.  Anti-Americanism Overlapping Subsets. 
 
                                                 
38 Mark Long, Rick L. Bunch, and Robert Earl Lloyd, “Measuring Anti-Americanism in Editorial 
Cartoons,” Social Science Quarterly 90, no. 3 (2009): 652, http://search.proquest.com/docview/
880198533?accountid=12702. 
39 Ibid.  
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This study by Long et al. concluded, “The most efficient way to express anti-
American sentiment is to belittle a U.S. icon.”40 This is an important point as an anti-
American sentiment in Twitter could take the form of hate or dislike towards an iconic 
American figure, place, or icon. Twitter queries may need to search for representations of 
America such as presidents’ names or terms like Lady Liberty to find hidden meaning in 
a textual content.  
Antulio Echevarria describes what he views are the four different types of wars of 
ideas. He breaks down the difference between intellectual debates, ideological wars, 
disputes over religion, and advertising campaigns. In ideological wars, large visions and 
notions collide around what Echevarria describes as a doctrine or formal path. He then 
offers the example of the Cold War, when political, economic, and military unrest fueled 
impassioned disputes between the United States, the Soviet Union, and each of their 
allies.41 Echevarria argues that an ideology is “any organized set of political or 
philosophical ideas, whether secular or non-secular.” It differs from a religious motive 
since it crosses both secular and non-secular lines.42 Getting behind an ideology can be 
difficult if it is too narrow or contains specific goals and grievances that do not 
necessarily resonate with a future potential terrorist. On the other hand, if an ideology is 
so vast that multiple grievances can be contained within it, it stands a better chance of 
attracting more popularity and gaining traction through osmosis of ideas and collective 
attitudes. Samuel Huntington in his article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” considers 
whether the fundamental sources of conflict have moved from conflicts of kings to 
conflicts of people, and successively, conflicts of nations-states to conflicts of 
ideologies.43 Huntington goes on to suggest that one ideology that has passed the test of 
time is the notion of “the West against the rest.”44 He argues that, “the very phrase ‘the 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 670. 
41 Antulio J. Echevarria, Wars of Ideas and the War of Ideas (monograph by Strategic Studies 
Institute, June 2008), vi. 
42 Ibid., 14.  
43 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign affairs (Summer 1993): 23. 
44 Ibid., 39. 
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world community’ has become the euphemistic collective noun…to give global 
legitimacy to actions reflecting the interest of the United States and other Western 
powers.”45  
When terrorist extremists get behind an anti-American ideology, it can become 
very dangerous. In an article for the American Psychologist, Fathali Moghaddam 
compares the act of extremist terrorism to the final step on a narrowing staircase of 
radical terrorist buy-in. Each floor corresponds to a different level of commitment to a 
terrorist ideology. The top floor is the apex where terrorists fully radicalize.46 By looking 
at Keohane and Katzenstein’s anti-American typology through the lens of this narrowing 
staircase, one can truly comprehend the danger of anti-American sentiment. On the 
ground floor, we find the majority of individuals and most grievances. The bottom floor 
is comprised of grievances of one’s material condition, and Moghaddam argues that 
perceived deprivation and perceived fairness make up the majority of these grievances.47 
Some cultural-elitist anti-American thinkers reside on this floor, although the issue for 
the elitists is not so much deprivation or injustice but rather simple disdain and repulsion. 
Individuals located on the second floor want procedural justice. They are angry about 
grievances and want the system to work in their favor in spite of the fact that it seldom, if 
ever, does.48 The second floor on Moghaddam’s staircase also incorporates a 
displacement of aggression. Specifically regarding anti-Americanism, Moghaddam 
argues, “The displacement of aggression onto out-groups, particularly the United States, 
has been channeled through direct and indirect support for institutions and organizations 
that nurture authoritarian attitudes and extremist behavior.”49 It is within the first two 
floors that the majority of anti-American thinkers fall. Not everyone with an anti-
American mindset commits terrorist acts. They have not all begun to alter their morality 
to accept terrorist acts as moral and just. Legacy anti-American sympathizers are 
disgruntled about past grievances, but they look to their government or relative authority 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 39. 
46 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 162.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 164.  
49 Ibid.  
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to right past wrongs and bring on justice. Similarly, liberal anti-Americans feel deprived, 
but that the United States should intervene or offer support when the need arises.  
On the third floor, we begin to separate the sentiment from the ideology of anti-
Americanism. Would-be terrorists disengage from morality as accepted by conventional 
government authorities and in turn look to the morality of their terrorist organizations as 
the new moral compass. They begin to justify their would-be terrorist acts as morally 
acceptable.50 The sovereign nationalist has entered the third floor, since the issue at hand 
still involves grievances and finding the right solution, though the “us vs. them” 
mentality permeates the thought process, and America is viewed not just as a problem but 
also as an enemy. Given that America is a threat to their people and way of life, violent 
acts may become increasingly imaginable. On the fourth floor, the “us vs. them” view of 
the world strengthens to the point where there is no turning back. The would-be terrorist 
becomes a full-blown recruit, and there is no exit strategy at this point.51 The dictatorial 
government is no longer fit to address the terrorist’s concerns, and terrorists often view 
their dictatorial governments as pawns of the United States.52 Radical anti-American 
thinkers have reached this fourth floor, and climbing to the fifth and final floor is not too 
difficult. The fifth floor is where the terrorist commits to conducting large violent acts 
against civilians, usually with the intent of mass casualties. In the mind of the terrorist, 
anyone who is not opposed to the government at this point is an opponent and deserves 
death.53  
Moghaddam suggests that there is no turning back once terrorists have reached 
the third floor and they have already defined an alternate morality for their actions. As 
soon as an individual has targeted America as the enemy, it is too late to persuade him or 
her otherwise. The notion of “America, the great Satan” has already taken hold. This 
implies that while we will never be able to convince all individuals with anti-American 
tendencies of U.S. nobility, our efforts should be focused where we can do the greatest 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 165.  
51 Ibid., 166.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
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good, by attempting to reach individuals before they have progressed to the upper floors 
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III. MEASURING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT  
A. OPINION POLLING AND SURVEYS  
The Pew Research Center is a nonprofit organization in Washington, DC, that 
“conduct(s) public opinion polling, demographic research, content analysis, and other 
data-driven social science research.”54 Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 
has become the largest work on anti-Americanism since 9/11. According to their website, 
Pew has conducted over 450,000 interviews in 64 countries (see Figure 1) to attempt to 
gain a global perspective on outsider views of the United States.  
 
Figure 1.  Pew Research Center Interviewed Countries, 2002–2016.55 
The goal of the Global Attitudes Project was to document America’s image 
problem. The Pew Research Center’s director, Andrew Kohut, learned that “America’s 
image had declined around the globe,” and the event of the invasion of Iraq played a big 
                                                 
54 “About,” Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/about/. 
55 Source: Global Attitudes Project, “Global Indicators Database,” Pew Research Center, accessed 
October 4, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/. 
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part in this.56 Specifically, regarding the United States, Pew asked respondents, “Please 
tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very 
unfavorable opinion of the United States.” Figures 2, 3, and 4 present the favorability 
ratings of the United States through the eyes of the U.S., Pakistani, and Japanese 
populace over the course of the survey.57 As can be seen in Figure 2, even some 
respondents within the U.S. did not have a favorable view of their country. 
 
Figure 2.  Percent of United States Responding Favorable, All Years Measured.58 
                                                 
 56 Kohut and Stokes, America against the World. 
57 Pew notes that when interpreting their results, the charts and figures referring to a “favorable” 
response include “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” responses. Similarly, an “unfavorable” 
response combines “very unfavorable” and “somewhat unfavorable” responses. See: Global Attitudes 
Project, “Global Indicators Database,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 4, 2016, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/. 
58 Source: Global Attitudes Project, “United States: Opinion of the United States,” Global Indicators 




Figure 3.  Percent of Pakistan Responding Favorable, All Years Measured.59 
 
Figure 4.  Percent of Japan Responding Favorable, All Years Measured.60 
                                                 
59 Source: Global Attitudes Project, “Pakistan: Opinion of the United States,” Global Indicators 
Database, Pew Research Center, accessed August 15, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/
1/country/166/. 
60 Source: Global Attitudes Project, “Japan: Opinion of the United States,” Global Indicators 
Database, Pew Research Center, accessed August 15, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/
1/country/109/. 
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Overall, the Global Attitudes survey points to the majority of surveyed nations as 
having a positive image of the United States. As of 2013, 28 of 38 nations had a 
“favorable opinion of the U.S. and across these nations a median of 63% [had] a positive 
view of America.”61 Overall, Global Attitudes survey opinions in Muslim nations were 
negative, including opinions in Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, the Palestinian territories, and 
Turkey.62  
In a similar manner to Pew’s Global Attitudes project, political scientist Giacomo 
Chiozza analyzed data from 42 countries in 2002, with over 38,000 respondents.63 His 
worldwide public opinion databases surveyed individuals from Africa, Asia, Europe, 
Latin America, and Islamic countries on a broad range of categories including 
technology, politics, and culture.64 Chiozza concluded that the idea of broad, sweeping 
anti-Americanism is a misperception. His data supports the findings of the Global 
Attitudes project. Chiozza found that most respondents “manifested a favorable reaction 
whenever asked to offer an overall evaluation of their feelings towards the United  
States. … It shows that anti-Americanism was not a predominant orientation among 
foreign publics as recently as 2002.”65  
B. WEB ANALYTICS AND SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS 
The website internetlivestats.com displays a ticker that records the real-time 
number of tweets sent through the Twitter network in a given day. The site claims that 
6,000 tweets are tweeted on average per second. According to their database, Twitter use 
grew from 5,000 daily tweets in 2007 to nearly 500 million per day in 2013, an increase 
by six orders of magnitude.66 Despite the 140-character limit per tweet, the amount of 
                                                 
61 Global Attitudes Project, “Global Image of the United States and China,” Pew Research Center, last 
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62 Ibid., 1. 
63 Giacomo Chiozza, Anti-Americanism and the American World Order, (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
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64 Ibid., 6. 
65 Ibid., 53. 
66 “Twitter Usage Statistics,” Internet Live Stats, accessed February 6, 2016, 
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data available on Twitter reflecting public opinion is impressive. In the same manner that 
Twitter was used as a platform for launching the violent protests of the Arab Spring, so 
too could a Twitter movement be launched against America by those who harbor anti-
American tendencies. In fact, as we have seen with the recent rise of ISIS recruiting and 
propaganda on Twitter, social media may be enabling this process. For example, Camber 
Warren in his piece “Explosive Connections,” illustrates how “social media 
technologies… serve to incentivize the promotion of the kinds of narrowly construed 
sectarian appeals and extremist ideologies which ultimately render collective violence 
imaginable and feasible.”67 More specifically, he argues that although mass media has 
reduced the “probability of large-scale civil violence,”68 social communication 
technologies such as Twitter, which link individuals horizontally, tend to divide people 
and increase the chances of collective violence.69 If people use social media as a news 
source more often than mass media, Warren’s hypothesis suggests that this developing 
trend could lead to more violence. It also suggests harnessing this data could prove 
effective in predicting violent trends. Unfortunately, just like in polling, social media 
analysis is not without its fair share of problems and difficulties.  
C. SENTIMENT ANALYSIS 
Over the last five years alone, the United States has awarded hundreds of patents 
for technologies that analyze social media.70 Some of the latest technology includes 
programs capable of “determining sentiment from text content” or “identifying event-
specific social discussion threads.”71 Political analysts have already used these 
programming tools to measure political sentiment. An example is the Lexicoder 
Sentiment Dictionary (LSD), which counts keywords from a text and compares them to a 
                                                 
67 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
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coded dictionary to determine positive or negative sentiment.72 During a joint venture 
between Princeton and Harvard universities, researchers used a social media analytics 
software called Crimson Hexagon to view Arabic reactions to major events in 2012 and 
2013 on Twitter.73 They found that “the analytics tool identified…more than 2.2 million 
Arabic tweets around the time of the overthrow of Morsi in 2013 that mentioned the 
U.S… No matter which side of the domestic dispute…he or she was likely to be opposed 
to the U.S.” In a surprising synopsis, Arab tweeters vehemently opposed U.S. influence 
in Middle Eastern affairs despite action that sided with Arab motives.74  
One critical aspect in sentiment analysis is creating a proper, tailored search 
query. If a query is too refined and detailed, it limits the results, making conclusions less 
significant. Alternatively, if the query is too broad, the results may generate false 
positives. Sentiment dictionaries provide an alternative to individual keyword searches 
when conducting sentiment analysis. Most sentiment dictionaries search for broad 
categories or bins of words that relate to a sentiment in general. Researchers use 
sentiment dictionaries such as Harvard’s General Inquirer dictionary with paired 
categories. Categories include positive versus negative, strong versus weak, active versus 
passive, pleasure versus pain, virtue versus vice, overstatement versus understatement, 
etc.75 The current public edition of the General Inquirer dictionary “combines the 
Harvard IV-4 dictionary content-analysis categories, the Lasswell dictionary content-
analysis categories, and five categories based on the social cognition work of Semin and 
Fiedler, making for 182 categories in all.”76 Of all the 182 categories, the two largest are 
the valence categories of positive and negative sentiment, which take basis in Charles 
Osgood’s theory of semantic differential and factor analysis. Osgood’s theory explains 
                                                 
72 Lori Young and Stuart Soroka, “Affective News: The Automated Coding of Sentiment in Political 
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how semantic analyses of the past have narrowed “adjectival scales” down to three types 
of vectors from neutral.77 These include evaluative factors such as positive-negative, a 
potency factor such as hard-soft, and an activity factor such as active-passive.78 This 
study concentrated on Osgood’s evaluative factor of determining positive and negative 
sentiment.  
I opted to use Harvard’s General Inquirer dictionary for my two case studies in 
Pakistan and Japan for two reasons. The first is that the General Inquirer dictionary has 
been well established in text and document sentiment analysis since the early 1960s. The 
second reason is that it seemed balanced, since it stood up to cross-cultural tests in 
semantic differentials. This would become critical later on in the follow-on case studies, 
since the dictionaries I selected required translation into the local case-study languages.  
D. HURDLES TO SENTIMENT ANALYSIS 
Those against social media analysis argue, first, based on representivity: 
“Research often depends on its ability to draw more general inferences about a wider 
population based on the data it uses and the methods it employs.”79 Miller et al. claim 
that one large problem with representivity in social media is the data are very large and 
difficult to decipher. For example, collection methods contain non-relevant tweets that 
complicate analysis and may miss some messages that are very important to the search at 
hand.80 Representivity in social media can also be inconsistent with the random sampling 
generally used in opinion polling. In addition, problems arise with translations when 
working on data from foreign countries. A foreign language that could have several 
versions of the word “happy” could prove difficult to a social media analyst. Moving past 
the format itself, online opinions can differ from offline opinions.81 In other words, some 
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users will tweet for the sociability of the experience or to feel part of the in-group. This 
can cause the user to use language that is not representative of his or her true feelings. 
Further issues arise with from the large number of tweets that are sent from a very small 
set of “power users.”82 Miller et al. suggest that 1% of accounts send between 14% and 
33% of the total tweets.83 Compounding this issue is the fact that some of these power 
users may be automated bots or part of institutions reflecting the overall views of a 
collective entity, not an individual.  
Further issues exist in countries where the government controls the extent to 
which the public can access social media or the mass media. A government that censors 
mass media and provides a strong slant on government-sponsored social media posts 
could potentially utilize social media to persuade other social media users. According to 
one source, when Twitter was utilized in masse to incite revolt during the 2011 Arab 
Spring, many governments shut it down in various countries including Algeria, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Cameroon, and Malawi.84 The countries of Turkey, Iran, China, and North Korea 
still block Twitter.85 These Twitter bans speak to the potency of the voice of Twitter 
users and how powerful those messages can be.  
When making inferences about the type of Twitter users in a network, geo-
locating Twitter users can be difficult. Individuals can tweet from various locations on 
the go via cell phone applications or falsify origin information from the start, as has been 
seen in various instances with pro-ISIS members using Twitter as a recruiting tool. The 
Twittersphere represents the voice of large populated areas, such as London, but some 
rural areas may not have a voice at all.86 Additionally, Twitter misrepresents some social 
demographics. Miller et al. found that tweets from men occurred more often than tweets 
from women on issues such as brands. Similar disparities in the normalization of data are 
visible with the categories of age and background. Miller et al. make the point that the act 
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of tweeting itself is an “agent of social change” and the context of the offline 
environment affects the online environment broadcast.87 As a conclusion, they come to 
realize that social media datasets in general are simply one form of social research, 
similar to surveys.88 Analysts cannot use social media datasets in a vacuum or without 
understanding the overall context of their use.  
E. STRENGTHS OF SENTIMENT ANALYSIS 
As Hutchison and Kumara point out in their work “Big Data Analytics,” archival 
data from social media forums has the power to inform future decisions and give a 
competitive edge.89 Take for example the use of Twitter to predict sales at the box office. 
Analysts gathered 2.89 million tweets on 24 different movies and ran them through 
binary sentiment analysis to determine how they would do in ticket sales. The results 
accurately predicted the high sellers and beat out the famous Hollywood Stock 
Exchange.90 Even more relevantly, the company Globalpoint Research conducted 
sentiment analysis using Twitter on the topic of the 2012 presidential New Hampshire 
primary. Through their data mining, they were able to predict the winner in addition to 
the closeness of results for the second-, third-, and fourth-place finishers.91 These 
examples shed light on the advantages of social media analysis.  
In addition, through advanced language translators and multimedia integrators, 
analysts can examine tweet sentiment from foreign countries. Computer algorithms are 
constantly evolving to decipher language quirks, making it easier to sift through relevant 
and irrelevant messages. One example of the political and military significance of this is 
the way that Topsy Labs attempted to “correlate the rising and falling trends in hashtags 
#iran, #egypt, and #yemen” to Arab Spring events in Tunisia, Egypt, and other locations 
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in the Middle East.92 Their data showed large increases in the number of tweets occurring 
at the same time as actual events critical to the revolution. These included “events such as 
the suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi…the 26-year-old Egyptian food vendor whose death 
crystallized for many dissidents…the need to take action.”93 In a similar manner, a 
German knowledge-engineering system known as PoliTwi was able to prove a high 
correlation between the occurrence of political events and their immediate appearance on 
Twitter. The firm took a sampling of four million tweets during the German 
parliamentary election and, by using sentiment hashtags, predicted political interests in a 
short time duration with capability equivalent to that of Google Trends.94  
One further advantage of data derived from the Twitter network lies in the 
availability of geo-location information. Each tweet contains geographical metadata, 
which comes in two main forms. “Activity location” records a user’s location based on a 
bounding box that goes to the neighborhood level.95 This data is relatively reliable, and 
offers high resolution, but is only available for the small fraction of users (around 2%) 
who allow GPS coordinates to be recorded when they transmit messages. The second 
source of geographic information is the “profile location,” which is filled out by the user 
at the time of account activation or later if desired. This can be imprecise, as a user might 
use their specific hometown as a location, such as San Francisco, CA, or an alias such as 
“the best city in the world.” Analysts at Twitter have created an additional geo-location 
category called the GNIP location, which provides geo-locations for a Twitter user by 
profile location, based upon a proprietary algorithm.96 This is the most thorough source 
for geo-spatial tracking of Twitter users, as it offers moderate accuracy but covers a large 
fraction (around 30%) of all users.  
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IV. CASE STUDY #1: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN PAKISTAN 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States and Pakistan have had a political relationship dating back to 
Pakistan’s inception in 1947.97 Since that time, the United States has become Pakistan’s 
largest economic partner, with bilateral trade between the two countries exceeding $5.1 
billion in FY2015, and 16% of Pakistani exports going to the U.S.98 After the attacks on 
the United States on September 11, 2001, the United States began to work closely with 
Pakistan on “security and stability in South Asia.”99 This included various 
counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (CI) efforts, primarily in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that lay on the northeast border that Pakistan shares 
with Afghanistan. Under these efforts, the United States promotes long-term CT and CI, 
with the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) unit supplying $265 million in funding in 
FY2015.100 The primary U.S. goal in Pakistan is to bolster the Pakistani security forces 
in an effort to maintain an ally in the region and eradicate terrorism, a threat to both 
countries. 
In 2004, the United States embarked on an effort to crush terrorism in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan through tactical operations including drone strikes. Drones, 
otherwise known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are attractive as offensive 
weapons since, as the name implies, they are unmanned. This attribute, coupled with the 
advancement of GPS and targeting, makes drones highly maneuverable and eliminates 
the risk of ground troop fatalities.101 Further, the standoff distance associated with drone 
strikes takes the risk of pilots’ lives out of the battle and shrouds the strikes in secrecy.102 
Secrecy is an advantage for the United States, since it is difficult to place blame on an 
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unseen aggressor. Secrecy is also a curse for the United States, as Pakistanis might 
assume that all drone strikes are to be attributable to the United States, even when this is 
not necessarily the case. The drone strike effort in Pakistan targets “top al-Qaeda leaders, 
al-Qaeda’s external operations network, and Taliban leaders and fighters who threaten 
both the Afghan and Pakistani states.”103  
In June of 2014, bilateral military operations between the two countries 
strengthened following a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attack on the Karachi airport 
that killed 28 people, including all 10 attackers involved.104 A combined offensive 
labeled Operation Zarb-e-Azb was initiated with the intent “to dislodge militant groups 
that have used the area as a base for well over a decade.”105 The majority of the drone 
strikes that have occurred on Pakistani soil since the start of Zarb-e-Azb take place in the 
province of North Waziristan, which lies within the FATA (see Figure 5).106  
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Figure 5.  Map of North Waziristan.107 
Additionally, as Figure 6 displays, the Long War Journal estimates that of all the 
drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004, “72% have hit targets in North Waziristan, and 23% 
have hit targets in South Waziristan.”108 Drone strikes have targeted the localities in their 
backyards for the last 12 years.  
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Figure 6.  U.S. Drone Strikes by District, 2004–2016.109 
North Waziristan contains four large Taliban groups: “the Mehsuds, Mullah 
Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and the Haqqanis.”110 According to the Long War Journal, 
“The Pakistani government currently considers Nazir … the Haqqanis, Bahadur, and 
Hekmatyar to be ‘good Taliban,’ as they do not carry out attacks against the Pakistani 
state.”111 Though there is disagreement regarding the regime’s true views on the matter, 
one certainty is that these strikes come with collateral damage. Unfortunately, drone 
strikes on Pakistani soil have reduced the U.S. public image among the Pakistani 
populace. Figure 7 depicts the average casualty rate per strike from the years 2004 until 
the present as reported by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 
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Figure 7.  Pakistan: Casualty Rates for Drone Strikes, 2004–Present.114
                                                 
114 Source: Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Get the Data.” 
 32 
According to the bureau, during the years 2013 and 2014, there were no validated 
civilian casualty reports associated with U.S. drone strikes.115 The years 2013 to 2014 
coincidentally saw the passing of a U.S. agreement to cease drone strikes in Pakistan. 
Other sources, however, tend to disagree with the zero casualty figures during these 
years. In contrast to the numbers published by the bureau, Table 2 presents the 
cumulative tallies of open-source drone strike reports in Pakistan as reported by various 
sources.  
Table 2. U.S. Drone Strike Totals in Pakistan, 2004–Present.116 
 
 
Despite the disparity between reports, the data collected by the bureau is thorough 
and substantiated by various legitimate reports. The bureau uses at least two distinct 
sources of credible information in order to validate each case. For many of the strikes 
reported by the bureau, eight or more sources validate the data.117 Although the strikes 
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“have killed members of various armed groups based in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, the 
Pakistan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network,” it is obvious the strikes have also inflicted 
collateral damage.118 As the numbers suggest, anywhere from 10%–25% of the 
individuals killed have been civilians, with the U.S. government source reporting the 
fewest civilian casualties publicly.  
Given the reality of these drone strikes, it is hard to imagine the life and concerns 
of individuals trying to live in the FATA in Pakistan. On one side, the people see bombs 
exploding around them, hitting houses, markets, and areas where they live, work, and 
play. Any civilian casualty must intensify the gravity of the situation for those in the 
immediate area. On the other side is the Taliban, with their oppressive nature and deathly 
magnetism. The Open Society Foundation relates one perspective from a local living in 
Waziristan: “if you allow the Taliban to sit with you then drones target them and you are 
killed with them. People are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.”119 There 
are those who see light at the end of the tunnel, however. One study conducted by a 
professor at Oklahoma University interviewed 147 individuals, and nearly 80% of them 
endorsed drones and the effects that they have on creating stability in the region. They 
link the eradication of suicide bombings to the killing of terrorist Qari Hussain, for 
example, but most likely do not understand the entire reasoning behind drone strikes or 
the war on terror. Author Rob Crilly found through his research that the closer he came to 
drone-strike-impacted areas, the more people tended to support CIA drone strikes.120 
Unfortunately, these are small samples and may not bear truth for all. 
The people of the FATA often feel abandoned, since infrastructure programs and 
aid supplied by the government are nonexistent. These people hear rumors that their 
government is on board with these targeted assassinations in their hometowns, and then 
the government does very little when there are civilian casualties.121 In some cases, the 
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lack of structure in the FATA, caused by military operations including drone strikes, 
provides an opportunity for Pakistani security forces to engage in human rights 
violations, further adding to the chaos and murkiness of the situation. The government 
gives these violations very little attention compared to those in other parts of the 
country.122 Drone strikes lead the people of the FATA to believe their government is 
helpless or a mere pawn employed at the whim of the United States. Pakistani generals 
feel they are constantly defending their allies, and the public often perceives America as 
the enemy. In the eyes of one military official, “It gives strength to the argument that this 
is not Pakistan’s war, it’s America’s war.”123 The combination of collateral damage, 
misinformation, and lack of information from both the Pakistani and U.S. governments to 
the Pakistani people is driving those Pakistanis with the weapon of Twitter to take a 
stand. They are seeking answers to a barrage of attacks that have decimated their ways of 
life.  
B. PAKISTANI TWITTER ENVIRONMENT 
The country of Pakistan, home to nearly 193 million people, is reported to have an 
Internet penetration of 17.8% with 34 million Internet users, a near 10% increase since 
2015.124 Innovation and technology are empowering the general populace in Pakistan, 
and the use of social media appears to be on the rise, despite an effort by the government 
to censor certain applications and websites it deems inappropriate. An increase in the use 
of Facebook, Twitter, Skype, and Instagram is collectively creating this rise. According 
to data published by online media forum Propakistani in January of 2016, Facebook is the 
leading social media site in Pakistan, with over three billion connections per day, and 
Twitter comes in second, with 280 million connections per day.125 A 2014 report put out 
by Twittistaan reports the number of Twitter users from Pakistan at over two million, 
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equating to 0.03% of global tweets or a 68th ranking among tweeting countries.126 These 
total numbers are far from large in comparison to worldwide Twitter use, but millions of 
users can still carry a big message.  
Propakistani notes that the Pakistani government, regulators, and operators have 
all made efforts to propel Internet adoption in Pakistan. Unfortunately, laws and 
intrusions by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) have hampered the 
country’s social media growth.127 The government gave the PTA authority to “take 
remedial measures to tackle the despicable phenomenon of pornography and obscenity 
that has a looming role to corrupt the youth of Pakistan.”128 As recently as January of 
2016, the PTA blocked 84,000 websites and made recommendations for over 400,000 
more to be blocked on the local levels, as they were thought to contain “objectionable or 
explicit content”—what the Pakistani government referred to as “salacious.”129 YouTube 
was on Pakistan’s blocked list for over three years after it posted a video containing 
“blasphemous content” and refused to take it down. It was not until early 2016 that the 
Pakistani government unblocked YouTube, after it released a software version allowing 
country-appropriate content.130  
C. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In order to examine the impact of specific events on local sentiment, I began by 
gathering open source data on U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan that coincided with the 
historical periods of Twitter data in the NPS archive, from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 
2014. The drone strike data is derived from the Covert Drone War database published by 
the Bureau of Investigative Journalism for this endeavor. This provided data to include 
date-time groups (DTGs) of the drone strikes, the location of the strikes, the number of 
casualties, and sources of the data to elaborate on the events.  
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To assess the sentiment of each message, I used the dictionary published by 
Harvard’s General Inquirer. The General Inquirer dictionary spreadsheets contain rows 
representing a different search category in each row (see Table 3). 
Table 3.  Sentiment Word Categories for Pakistan Case Study (Truncated). 
 
 
For this study, I utilized three categories of the dictionary, focusing on positive, 
negative, and hostile sentiment. I also added one additional category of “America” terms 
to supplement my query, as shown in Table 3.  
The original positive dictionary contained 1,915 words, the negative dictionary 
contained 2,291 words, and the hostile dictionary contained 833 words. To translate these 
terms into local languages, each term was run through the online Google Translate API, 
to attempt to translate each term into each of the 82 languages provided through the tool, 
including Urdu, Pashto, Punjabi, and Sindhi. Queries were then generated by applying the 
terms from the language identified in the metadata from the message, using the original 
English terms for any messages for which the language could not be identified.  
To conduct the queries of the Twitter archive, I created a spreadsheet recording 
the latitude and longitude of the 20 most populated cities in Pakistan and used a search 
radius of 25 kilometers to define an inclusive area around each city associated with 
Twitter user GNIP locations. For each message found within each radius, I then recorded 
the presence of character strings in the messages matching any of the categories from the 
search dictionary described above.131 These records were then aggregated into counts 
for the occurrence of each category, and the total number of messages, for each city, on 
an hourly basis. 
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To assess the relationship between drone strike events and message volumes, I 
utilize negative binomial regression models. Table 4 lists the independent and dependent 
variables used in the models. For each dynamic independent variable, I include multiple 
versions of the variable representing lag periods of one day, seven days, and 30 days. For 
instance, “airstrike_1d” records the occurrence of drone strikes in the past day, while 
“killed_30d” records the number of deaths resulting from drone strikes over the past 30 
days. All models also include controls for the total population of each city, and the total 
count of Twitter messages, to adjust for potential differences between larger and smaller 
cities.  
Table 4.  Pakistan Drone Strikes—Regression Model Variables. 
 
 
To assess the robustness of the results, the models utilize two different units of 
analysis. The first three models use city-days as a unit of analysis, while the second three 
models use city-hours. Within each group, each model uses a different dependent 
variable. In the first model, the dependent variable is “America” tweets, which counts the 
number of messages matching the “America” category of search terms. In the second 
model, the dependent variable is “negative America” tweets, which records the count of 
messages that match search terms in both the “negative” category and the “America” 
category. Similarly, in the third model, the dependent variable is “positive America” 
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tweets. The second and third models also include controls for the total count of 
“America” tweets. These results are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5.  U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan—Effects on Twitter Sentiment. 
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1. Model 1 
In this model, I attempted to measure what effect (if any) the occurrence of a 
drone strike in Pakistan had on the number of “America” tweets in the vicinity of the top 
20 most populated cities in Pakistan. The model revealed the following results:  
– The salience of “America” tweets rose immediately following a drone strike 
and remained elevated through a 30-day period following the strike.  
– The total number of people killed in a drone strike was associated with a 
decrease in “America” tweets in the short term (one day) and an increase in 
“America” tweets in the long term (30 days).  
Moreover, these coefficients were each highly statistically significant, with p < 0.01 
2. Model 2 
 In this model, I attempted to measure what effect (if any) the occurrence of a 
drone strike in Pakistan had on the number of “negative America” tweets in the vicinity 
of the top 20 most populated cities in Pakistan. The model revealed the following results:  
– The number of “negative America” tweets rose immediately following a drone 
strike and remained elevated through a seven day period following the strike, 
with both coefficients statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. 
– This rise appears to have leveled off when considering longer periods, as 
indicated by the insignificant coefficient for the 30 day lagged version of the 
airstrike variable.  
3. Model 3 
 In this model, I attempted to measure what effect (if any) the occurrence of a 
drone strike in Pakistan had on the number of “positive America” tweets in the vicinity of 
the top 20 most populated cities in Pakistan. The model revealed the following results:  
– The number of “positive America” tweets rose through a seven day period 
following the strike (p < 0.01), but then leveled off for the 30 day period. 
– The total number of people killed in an airstrike had a strong negative 
association (p < 0.01) with the number of “America” tweets in the seven days 
following a drone strike.  
These same patterns are also generally seen in the robustness checks presented in Models 
4–6, which use city-hours as the unit of analysis, rather than city-days. Each model again 
 40 
shows positive and statistically significant coefficients, indicating that drone strikes 
generate systematic increases in “America” tweets, “negative America” tweets, and 
“positive America” tweets across all three temporal periods. 
D. SUMMARY 
The evidence from this study on drone strikes in Pakistan suggests that drone 
strikes in general result in an overall salience of the category of “America” in tweets sent 
from within Pakistan. This salience continues even one month following a drone strike. 
Since drones do not come within visible range of the targets on the ground, this implies 
that any strike from the sky is assumed to be a drone strike by Americans in the eyes of 
the local population. As the United States carries out the majority of these drone strikes, 
it makes sense that in the timeframe following a drone strike, increased chatter regarding 
America should surface. It appears that a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan becomes an 
opportunity for individuals to air their issues regarding America, both in a good and a bad 
light. Further analysis shows that there is strong association between drone strikes in 
Pakistan and “negative America” tweets, even after controlling for the increased salience 
in the category of “America” and the total number of tweets per city. This phenomenon 
occurs in the day immediately following a drone strike and becomes more pronounced in 
the seven days following a drone strike, which may be an indication that it often takes a 
few days for information about a strike to make its way to the masses. Although this 
information is not surprising initially, the implications are that no matter how many bad 
terrorists are killed during a drone strike, negative sentiment towards America is still 
surfacing. The Pakistani government may have been fully behind a strike, but is not 
changing the sentiment towards America either. 
Looking holistically at the data, it is not uncharacteristic for an individual of any 
country to feel angst, rage, or isolation from their government when drone strikes are 
executed on a regular basis, on their home soil, and when collateral damage has occurred 
frequently. Anti-American sentiment, as evidenced through the Pakistani Twittersphere, 
rises with the advent of a drone strike, despite the intent of the United States, despite the 
number of terrorists killed, despite the U.S.-Pakistani alliance, and despite the attempts of 
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the Pakistani government to inform the populace of the underlying U.S. motives. And 
herein lies the problem.  
E. MOVING FORWARD 
This case study attempted to peel back the layers of the issue surrounding drone 
strikes and their ability to spur anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. The data 
demonstrate that it is possible to see a relationship between the number of tweets with a 
positive or negative sentiment and the coincidence of an American drone strike. Madiha 
Afzal points out in an op-ed for the Brookings Institution that drone strikes do not simply 
anger the ignorant or uninformed people of Pakistan. They are actually swaying the 
opinion of moderate, liberal, and educated Pakistanis who in the past have tended to 
support the United States.132 According to Afzal, these educated elite are bothered by the 
lack of transparency regarding the U.S. government’s initiatives and the results of these 
drone strikes. Afzal cites a 2011 Pew Global Attitudes survey that points out that 55% of 
those interviewed in Pakistan had heard about the occurrence of drone strikes.133 This 
same survey reveals that education increases the chances that an individual in Pakistan 
would know about drone strikes. The crux of these facts pointed to how 95% of those 
with knowledge of drone strikes believe that drones were “a bad or very bad thing,” and 
this is a bad thing for America.134 These educated liberals to whom Afzal refers “form 
the heart of an active civil society in Pakistan, which the U.S. counts on to serve as a 
counterweight to the radical segments of Pakistani society.”135 If America cannot 
convince the educated elite of a country that drone strikes are good for the country, it will 
find it hard to sway the national perception. The educated elite typically lead the country; 
they gather people around a common sentiment, and when that sentiment is negative, 
there is little hope for the United States.  
Opponents of the use of drone strikes make a two-pronged argument:  
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First, drones can give radicals ammunition for recruiting those on the 
margin of becoming terrorists… The second argument is that drones may 
convert entirely non-radical individuals into joining terrorist groups since 
non-radical individuals could become riled up by the havoc wreaked by 
U.S. drone strikes.136  
Looking back at Moghaddam’s framework regarding the staircase to terrorism, 
the individuals mentioned above are teetering between the second floor and the third 
floor, a critical turning point in a terrorist’s thought process. On the second floor, 
individuals are searching out a displacement of aggression. On the third floor, would-be 
terrorists disengage from morality as accepted by conventional government authorities 
and in turn look to the morality of a terrorist organization as the new moral compass.137 
What the United States needs to do is stop these two types of individuals from stepping 
further up the staircase to terrorism, especially if they are connected socially with an 
active Twitter account.  
The data presented in this case study points to an increased salience of “America” 
on Twitter chatter following a drone strike. What the United States can do here is fill the 
vacuum that is created following a drone strike in Pakistan. The data suggests there is an 
immediate spike in anti-American sentiment regardless of the number of people killed in 
the strike. This implies that the U.S. needs to be more transparent with its intentions and 
assuring the people of Pakistan that drone strikes are well-researched, isolated, and 
intended to bolster the safety of both nations in the long run, despite occasional civilian 
casualties.  
On July 1, 2016, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a 
long-awaited report detailing the number of drone strikes and noncombatant casualties 
associated with these strikes from January 20, 2009 through December 31, 2015.138 For 
many, this report came as too little, too late. Afzal offers that the United States needs to 
“engage the Pakistani public in explaining its rationale for conducting drone strikes 
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relative to other options to eradicate militants.”139 Additionally, the United States has to 
point out when key targets have been taken out and has to be humble enough to accept 
fault when civilian casualties occur. Finally, Afzal argues that the United States should 
give some reasoning as to why Pakistani militaries alone cannot contain the terrorist 
threat on their home soil.140 An isolated report on casualties that follows a single 
previous report from February 2013 is not open transparency. If the United States truly 
wants to assist Pakistan and eradicate terrorism for both its ally and itself, it needs to 
better inform the Pakistani people in hopes of gaining popular support in the nation.  
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V. CASE STUDY #2: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN JAPAN 
A. BACKGROUND 
In May of 2016, President Barack Obama visited Hiroshima, the first sitting U.S. 
president to visit the site of the nuclear bomb which killed more than 140,000 people and 
led to the end of the Japanese resistance during WWII. Obama spoke to a “moral 
awakening” and how important it is to protect the peace and freedoms of the children of 
Hiroshima.141 The occasion was both sobering for victims’ families and encouraging to 
those who saw this as recognition by the United States of the atrocities of the bomb. 
Obama summarized the current U.S.-Japanese relationship as “a testament to how even 
the most painful divides can be bridges; how our two nations—former adversaries—
cannot just become partners but become the best of friends and the strongest of allies.”142 
The United States and Japan have had a love-hate relationship that dates to the late 18th 
century. Early explorers such as John Kendrick stopped on the Japanese islands and 
initially tried to claim them as U.S. territories.143 Commodore Perry furthered the U.S. 
Japanese relations by attempting to expand trade, but threatened military muscle to force 
an agreement.144 The turning point in the relations occurred following WWII and the 
dropping of the atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Treaty of San 
Francisco established the United States Forces Japan with the goal “to defend the country 
from external threats.”145 Currently, the United States has more troops in Japan than in 
any other country in the world, with approximately 54,000 on Japanese soil and 26,000 of 
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these troops on the prefecture of Okinawa.146 This points to the importance of the region, 
but it also shows the magnitude of the U.S. military occupation, which at times has led to 
hostilities between the two nations.  
In 1947, following WWII, the United States led the allied powers in drafting a 
constitution for Japan with an article forbidding the country from engaging in military 
aggression.147 Japan is a country with very strong military investments but a 
constitutional provision prohibiting an offensive force. Instead, they maintain a robust 
Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Current Japanese leadership, including Prime 
Minister Shinzō Abe, feels a change to Article 9 is needed to allow for a more 
“traditional military,” but this change would require large muscle movements.148 The 
country is divided on military issues, with some looking for sovereignty over all military 
operations and others accepting their dependence on the potent U.S. military. Other 
divisive issues also separate the prefecture of Okinawa from the rest of the country.  
Despite unique cultural differences, Okinawa, which used to be called Ryukyu, 
was adopted into mainland Japan in the mid-1800s.149 The island was home to one of the 
largest bloodsheds during WWII for the Japanese. According to Michael LaRow in his 
thesis on the American military presence, the fighting on Okinawa led to 14,000 
American and 234,000 Japanese soldier deaths during a three-month time period toward 
the end of WWII. LaRow equates the massive loss of life to the loss of life from both of 
the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.150 Adding to the pain of this event was 
how the Imperial Japanese Army forced locals from Okinawa to turn and fight the allies 
or commit suicide before surrendering. Large masses of civilians chose the latter option 
of suicide and jumped off cliffs to end their lives.151 These gruesome deaths have left a 
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deep scar on the minds of the people of Okinawa and caused ill will aimed at the pro-U.S. 
government and the United States in general. In the vacuum that was created following 
the battle of Okinawa, the United States established the U.S. Civilian Administration of 
the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), which would form the “executive, parliament, and judicial 
system for the indigenous people.”152 The U.S. military maintained the power to appoint 
the governor of the USCAR up until the year 1968. This came with the power to override 
judicial decisions if required to maintain military security.153 It is estimated that nearly 
14% of Okinawan land was taken over by coercion at gunpoint or bought by the U.S. 
military in the 1960s.154 Many locals were displaced and promised land in the harsh 
farming environments of Bolivia as compensation, but only a few were actually 
successful in farming these areas.155 This coercion and harsh treatment of the local 
populace left a bitter taste in the mouths of those families that were displaced. LaRow 
argues that this legacy anti-American sentiment in Okinawa runs deep due to the coercive 
land practices that the United States used. Despite these economic land issues, LaRow 
also recognizes that anti-American sentiment has additionally stemmed from military and 
social injustices.156 
The military presence in Japan has been met with open arms by some who enjoy 
the security of the powerful U.S. military patrolling their backyard and warding off 
Chinese aggression. Nevertheless, for a growing number of Japanese citizens, the U.S. 
military has overstayed its welcome. A large thrust behind the anti-American movement 
directed at the military stems from events that together paint a negative picture of 
American soldiers. Proceedings by the Japanese House of Representatives documented 
over 200,000 “scandals involving rape, vehicular homicide, and other violent crimes 
perpetrated by U.S. service members against Japanese civilians” from the years 1954–
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2000.157 In an infamous act adding fuel to the fire, two Marines and a U.S. sailor were 
found guilty of raping and murdering a 12-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa in 1995, 
invigorating vehement anti-American sentiment.158 More recently, in March of 2016, a 
soldier was arrested for the rape of a Japanese tourist, and in May of 2016, a U.S. Marine 
strangled a Japanese woman to death.159 The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security contained a clause allowing U.S. soldiers, accused of committing crimes on 
Japanese soil, to attend trials back in the United States under the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA).160 Only recently did the United States relinquish the authority to 
extradite soldiers in the case of criminal action. Currently, the United States will turn 
over soldiers to the Japanese justice system, but only in the cases of rape and murder.161 
The American military wants to continue to expand its presence on the Japanese 
islands, and this has been met with deep resistance, especially considering the 
aforementioned events. The United States is looking to move Marines out of Futenma 
airbase to a new coastal base in Okinawa due to the proximity of Futenma to a populated 
city. Further, initiatives for a new military facility at Henoko have continued despite 
Okinawan protest through the Tokyo government.162 There is much internal strife in 
Japan over these issues, as the governor of Okinawa is vehemently opposed to future 
expansion but Japan’s prime minister is advocating for it.163 Okinawans argue the issues 
of noise, pollution, and danger due to the proximity of the aircraft operations to 
residential and school areas.164 Not only would further expansion exacerbate these issues, 
but also the influx of soldiers could mean more violent crimes, and this is the last thing 
the Japanese people desire.  
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B. JAPANESE TWITTER ENVIRONMENT 
In 2008 Twitter launched a language-specific Twitter application in Japan, and it 
took off like wildfire in the country’s media-connected society.165 The new application 
allowed the use of Japanese characters and almost doubled the communication power of 
the English version. As an example, the word information can be written with only two 
characters in Japanese, while it would take 11 characters to transmit in its entirety in 
English.166 Twitter followed up with a mobile version of the social media application in 
2010, giving yet another outlet for Japanese youth to break the mold of conformity 
associated with their culture.167 A recent report on the social media landscape in Japan 
reveals that Twitter is second only to Line, a mobile messaging app involving gaming, in 
Japan’s social-media-rich society. Line boasts 50 million users a month, equating to 40% 
of Japan’s population, while estimates from February of 2016 put the total number of 
Twitter users at 35 million.168 This equates to 35.4% of Japanese Internet users and 
nearly 28% of Japan’s total population.169 This accounts for 11% of world Twitter use, 
putting Japan on the map as the only country where Twitter penetration has surpassed 
that of Facebook.170 Surprisingly, Japanese Twitter users started tweeting more than 
Americans did in the year 2010.171 Rocky Eda, corporate communications manager for 
Twitter operations in Japan, stated, “In finding fulfillment in expressing what’s on your 
mind for the moment, Twitter is like haiku… It is so Japanese.”172 
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When one dissects the Twitter environment in Japan, it turns out Twitter became 
popular in Japan for similar reasons to its popularity in other countries such as the United 
States. Acar and Deguchi however, attribute existing differences between the U.S. and 
Japanese Twitter use to a relationship between culture and Twitter.173 Twitter ranks 
highest in popularity among youth ages 15–24 for the reasons of anonymity, the 140-
character availability, and its compatibility with mobile phones.174 Younger users tweet 
to communicate with others, while older generations use the service primarily for news 
and up-to-date information feeds.175 Twitter allows young users to communicate and 
express emotion without fear of reprisal, possibly something the U.S. users take for 
granted.176 In Acar and Deguchi’s study, 4,000 tweets from 200 college students were 
analyzed, with the content results revealed in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8.  Comparison of Japanese and American Tweets.177 
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Although seemingly similar in many regards, the largest disparity between the 
two countries as reported by Acar and Deguchi was in the number of self-related tweets. 
Additionally, Japanese users tweeted extensively about TV, and American users tweeted 
more about news, sports, and family.178 Acar and Deguchi found that Americans tended 
to ask more questions and have more “friends-and-family-related messages” in their 
tweets. Japanese Twitter users tended to not ask as many questions and to tweet more 
about themselves. The authors felt this pattern was not attributed to selfish tendencies but 
rather was a way of showing sensitivity toward others.179 
Although the trend is that the United States tweets more about news than Japan, 
following a 9.0-magnitude earthquake that occurred in March 2011 along the country’s 
northeastern coast, the Japanese took to Twitter in droves, with Twitter becoming more 
reliable than phone or email services.180 The earthquake, the subsequent aftershocks, and 
resulting tsunami resulted in 20,000 deaths, over 400,000 displaced individuals, and a lot 
of confusion.181 Japanese locals flocked to Twitter to communicate with friends and 
family, to inform others of their wellbeing, and to search for up-to-date information from 
government agencies. Umihara points out that the psychological effects of using Twitter 
during this disaster were both positive and negative.182 On a positive note, government 
info was provided without time delays, and this information provided the locations of 
available food and supplies. As a negative, first responders and locals alike had to filter 
through substantial misinformation, causing many to make careful selections of where 
they were getting their data from. Umihara suggests that this disaster prompted receivers 
of bad information to take the initiative and in turn become their own information 
sources, advising others of critical information.183 Culturally, the study pointed out that 
“Japanese do not communicate just through words, but also convey their feelings 
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nonverbally…by smiling, changing their speed of speech, and pausing.”184 This is similar 
to the realizations of Acar and Deguchi regarding sensitivity in the Japanese 
Twittersphere. 
Given the nature of the Twitter landscape in Japan, it seems to represent a ripe 
medium for showcasing variations in anti-American sentiment for the following reasons: 
1) the popularity of the social media application throughout the entire country, 2) the 
popularity of Twitter as an anonymous communication tool, allowing free flow of 
emotion without reprisal, and 3) the tendency of Japanese Twitter users to truly wear 
their feelings on their sleeves and speak their mind.  
C. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Given Japan’s strong ties to the U.S. military, changing sentiment based on an 
increased U.S. military presence on the islands, and frequent use of Twitter, I set out to 
look for significant Twitter sentiment changes based on the occurrence of large-scale 
military exercises. My hypothesis was that the larger the U.S. footprint on Japanese soil 
became due to an exercise, the more recognizable the anti-American sentiment on Twitter 
would be. I also hypothesized that it would be possible to see a difference in sentiment 
based on the number of Japanese and U.S. troops involved in each exercise, in addition to 
the duration of the exercise.  
In 1997, Japanese and the U.S. militaries released a joint document entitled “The 
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.”185 The document strengthened military 
ties between the two countries and served as a war doctrine expanding the “joint military 
activities of the United States and Japan outside the Japanese territory.”186 The guidelines 
as outlined in 1997 included plans for over 10 joint military exercises each year by all 
branches of the U.S. and Japanese services.187 This frequency of exercise participation 
has continued through the present day. Some exercises—such as Rim of the Pacific 
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(RIMPAC), which is conducted in and around the Hawaiian Islands—are very large, 
involving as many as 25,000 soldiers.188 Many of the exercises involving Japanese and 
U.S. soldiers center around a joint operational plan aimed at an “emergency on the 
Korean Peninsula.”189 They involve ground, sea, and air battles and simulations, but also 
involve command posts and more recently missile defense systems.190 In recent news, the 
fourth round of nuclear test launches from North Korea spurred the United States, Japan, 
and South Korea to add a “joint anti-missile exercise” to RIMPAC 2016.191 The 
recurring bilateral and multilateral exercises, aimed at countering both North Korean and 
Chinese offensives, have increased in both size and scope. U.S. and Japanese military 
forces have worked together to create some of the largest and most realistic exercises in 
the Pacific theater.  
For this case study, I reached out to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) 
Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), and the Mutual Defense Assistance Office 
(MDAO) in Tokyo, Japan. I went to these organizations with a query for a list of all 
large-scale bilateral or multilateral exercises that the U.S. military had participated in 
with the JSDF. The timeframe for my query needed to coincide with the Twitter archival 
database. From my queries, I was able to compile a list of 10 large-scale exercises that 
occur on a regular basis, either annually or bi-annually, and involve soldiers from the 
U.S. military and the JSDF. The occurrence of these events on a regular basis was a 
benefit, as it added to the notoriety of these events in the local Japanese communities. 
Table 6 shows the ten large bilateral or multilateral exercises that the United States 
participated in with Japan within the timeframe of August 2013 to July 2014.
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Table 6.  U.S.-Japanese Joint Military Exercises August 2013–July 2014. 
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In keeping with the approach used in the first case study on Pakistan, I opted to 
use the Harvard General Inquirer Dictionary for my sentiment analysis. I utilized the 
same three categories of the dictionary for standardization purposes, looking again at the 
categories of positive, negative, and hostile sentiment, in addition to the category of 
“America” terms. I also added a search category containing U.S. military service 
acronyms and exercise names. Excerpts from these categories can be seen in Table 7.  
Table 7.  Sentiment Word Categories for Japan Case Study (Truncated). 
 
 
In keeping with the methodology of the first case study, I used the Google 
Translate tool to translate the categorical sentiment terms before running the Japanese 
tweet query. As before, I began with a spreadsheet recording the top 20 most populated 
cities in Japan and used a search radius of 25 kilometers to define an inclusive area 
around each city associated with Twitter-user location identifiers. These records were 
then aggregated into counts for the occurrence of each search category, for each city, on 
an hourly basis. Due to the quality of the models, I opted to use a city-day unit of analysis 
again for this case study.  
As before, all models reported below are negative binomial models. Table 8 
shows the independent and dependent variables used. The key independent variable, 
“Exercise Occurrence” records the occurrence of large-scale military exercises involving 
both U.S. and Japanese forces, again using lag periods of one day, seven days, and 30 
days. All models also include controls for the total population of each city, and the total 
count of Twitter messages, to adjust for potential differences between larger and smaller 
cities. The results of the city-day models are presented in Table 9. 
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1. Model 1 
 In this model I attempted to measure what effect (if any) the occurrence of a 
large-scale U.S.-Japanese exercise had on the number of “America” tweets in the vicinity 
of the top 20 most populated cities in Japan. The model revealed the following results:  
– The occurrence of a U.S.-Japanese joint exercises off Japanese soil is 
associated with increased salience of “America” tweets in the seven-day 
period following the exercise (p < 0.01). 
– The occurrence of U.S.-Japanese joint exercises on Japanese soil is associated 
with decreased salience of “America” tweets in the seven-day period 
following the exercise (p < 0.01). 
2. Model 2 
 In model I attempted to measure what effect (if any) the occurrence of a large-
scale U.S.-Japanese exercise had on the number of “negative America” tweets in the 
vicinity of the top 20 most populated cities in Japan. The model revealed the following 
results:  
– The occurrence of U.S.-Japanese exercises is associated with decreased levels 
of “negative America” tweets on the day of the exercise (p < 0.01) 
– The occurrence of U.S.-Japanese exercises is associated with increased levels 
of “negative America” tweets in the seven-day and 30-day period following 
the exercise (p < 0.01). 
3. Model 3 
 In this model I attempted to measure what effect (if any) the occurrence of a 
large-scale U.S.-Japanese exercise had on the number of “positive America” tweets in the 
vicinity of the top 20 most populated cities in Japan. The model revealed the following 
results: 
– The occurrence of U.S.-Japanese joint exercises is associated with increased 
levels of “positive America” tweets in the 30-day period following the 
exercise (p < 0.01).  
– The occurrence of U.S.-Japanese joint exercises on Japanese soil is associated 
with decreased levels of “positive America” tweets in the seven-day period 




The data from this study on U.S.-Japanese joint exercises reveals that the salience 
of the category “America” increases in the Japanese Twittersphere in the seven days 
following an exercise and then drops off after 30 days. Further, there is a strong 
relationship between the occurrence of an exercise and the number of “negative America” 
tweets. This fact holds true even after controlling for total number of tweets, total 
“America” tweets, city population, and whether or not the exercise takes place on 
Japanese soil. One can see a significant decrease in “negative America” tweets on the day 
of the exercise, possibly while individuals are realizing who is participating in the 
exercise. This soon turns toward “negative America” tweets seven days following an 
exercise and continues up to 30 days. After 30 days, the salience of “America” tweets 
dies off, but more pointed tweets surface both with a negative and positive sentiment. 
Seemingly, 30 days following an exercise the populace has been given time to digest 
what has occurred and opinions are now being formulated as to whether this was 
beneficial or not. 
When these joint exercises occur on Japanese soil, the number of “negative 
America” tweets increases immediately following an exercise and then significantly 
decreases after a 30-day period following an exercise start. One explanation might be that 
at first, it takes individuals time to realize that an exercise is occurring, but after many 
days this becomes obvious. Whether this occurs due to increased noise, increased traffic, 
or increased number of incidents, Japanese locals increase their “negative America” 
tweets the longer it has been since the exercise started. It is not until 30 days following an 
exercise that one sees the most significance of an exercise occurrence on the number of 
negative tweets. An initial decrease in “negative America” sentiment could be caused by 
an influx of soldiers, boosting the local economy. According to one source, the military 
presence in Okinawa alone “accounts for 5% of the Okinawan economy, consuming 
resources and engaging with local businesses.”192 This is an obvious plus, and the thrill 
of business could be a driver behind this decrease in “negative America” tweets initially. 
However, as it becomes obvious that an exercise is lasting longer than a few days, or as 
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rowdy troops take a toll on the community, this positive or neutral sentiment could easily 
turn negative. Regardless of the duration of an exercise, the initial benefit that the 
community might appreciate in the beginning can soon turn sour as the Japanese debate 
on the fact that America still has a heavy hand over them with limitations on their 
military power.  
Contrary to my initial hypothesis, the data showed that the occurrence of a joint 
U.S.-Japanese exercise rarely had a strong effect on “positive America” tweets, though it 
did have a small effect on the number of “positive America” tweets after a 30-day period 
following the start of an exercise. It may be that the Japanese do not realize the benefits 
of these exercises until after the troops, boats, and aircraft have left the Japanese islands 
and the media informs the public of why these exercises are beneficial. Until this time, 
the goals and purposes of the exercise may be unclear.  
E. MOVING FORWARD 
This case study examined the relationship between the occurrence of U.S.-
Japanese bilateral or multilateral exercises and shifts in anti-American sentiment as 
evidenced through Twitter messages. Regarding my first hypothesis, this research has 
demonstrated that analysts can use sentiment in Twitter messages to gauge the overall 
sentiment of the Japanese nation in response to large U.S.-Japanese exercises. We saw 
that the data generally points to a large increase in “negative America” tweets with the 
advent of these exercises. Further analysis was able to show relationships between the 
location of these exercises and spikes in sentiment tweets. My second hypothesis was that 
events such as military occupations, large influxes of American troops to an area, or 
deaths at the hands of the American government or military would cause a large 
fluctuation in anti-American sentiment. Large military exercises such as the ones 
examined in this case study carry with them large troop movements, and bring up bitter 
latencies between the two nations’ militaries. It is important to note that recent events 
such as Sino-Japanese tensions and North Korean missile testing may change the way the 
Japanese perceive large exercises with the big brother United States. This case study only 
looked at the exercises from August 2013 to July of 2014. Additionally, it is difficult to 
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attribute the entire increase or decrease in negative sentiment to the advent of an exercise 
involving the United States. In other words, there may be certain triggers within these 
exercises, such as an aircraft flying too low, or an incident caused by an unruly U.S. 
soldier, which spark anti-American sentiment. This study represents a step in the 
direction of determining which forms of analysis are required to scope the cause of anti-
American sentiment down even further. Once we have determined that a certain exercise 
has a relationship to an increase in anti-American sentiment, we could then look to 
specific events that cast negative light on the American portion of the exercise and 
tighten up our unit of analysis.  
Pooja Podugu with the Harvard Political Review argues, “The spirit of 
extraterritoriality is both insulting and enabling: it demeans the Japanese culture and 
justice system while also alerting U.S. service members to the obvious lack of 
punishment for heinous crimes.”193 The Japanese have been calling for U.S. military 
downsizing for years. The military restrictions imposed by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation are outdated and attack at Japanese sovereignty. As Podugu suggests, 
modern-day pacifist Japan is nothing like the militarized nation that existed during 
WWII.194 Although it is obvious Japan enjoys the military confidence associated with 
U.S. military backing, heinous crimes and the lack of U.S. action following such crimes 
hang heavy on the hearts of many Japanese. Podugu argues that the United States can 
either stay put with current levels of troops and U.S. intervention, can draw down troops 
and basing, or can remove troops completely from Japan.195 Given the current pressure in 
the area from China and North Korea, it may prove disadvantageous for the United States 
to pull all troops out of Japan at this time. Regardless, the United States needs to start 
giving Japan the respect it deserves regarding the sovereignty of its country. Pulling some 
troops out of Japan would show a respect for the public outcry and could prove 
economically beneficial for a tightening U.S. defense budget.196  
                                                 
193 Ibid., 3. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid., 2. 
196 Ibid., 3. 
 62 
The analysis presented here has shown that social media can be used to measure 
increases and decreases in sentiment regarding a large-scale military exercises. Although 
a common thought might be that the Japanese welcome a strong U.S. military presence, 
this case study shows that this might not be the case. Public support of a strong U.S. 
military presence might change depending on the times and the situations. If the United 
States truly respects the opinion of the Japanese populace, tools such as Twitter analysis 
could be used to enhance efforts at analyzing the likely responses in public opinion that 
are generated by these large-scale exercises. Doing so would allow more effective 
judgments about the consequences of our force posture, and more expedient responses 




John Arquilla has written “wars have been decided in favor of the side that knew 
more about its enemy’s dispositions and intentions.”197 Although referring primarily to 
intentions regarding troops and military strategy, one has to imagine that the populace 
can definitely influence this strategy. If Arquilla is correct, then what are the implications 
if we could accurately predict the escalation of political unrest and extremist activity 
based on an analysis of readily available, social media data and then squash it and counter 
the narrative? The question is not so much, “what if” anymore, as this thesis’s case 
studies on Pakistan and Japan demonstrate. The technology is already in place. The 
United States can use this capability to affect the efficiency of foreign interactions, 
smooth the path for proposed increased troop presence, or warn of trouble once the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to a mission. This, in turn, could result in 
the saving of hundreds if not thousands of lives. From an information perspective, web 
analytics in the form of Twitter analysis could give the United States a leg up on winning 
“hearts and minds” around the world, a battle that continues to take its toll on the 
country.198 Social media analysis provides instantaneous data at the fingertips of the 
policy makers in Washington and telltale signs of danger or opportunity to come. 
Pratkanis argues, “Winning hearts and minds uses such devices as public diplomacy, 
pamphlets, Voice of America, and other means to explain U.S. policy…to create an 
appreciation and understanding of American culture.”199 If we can determine what 
generates the public outcry against America, we can possibly turn that on its head to 
realize what creates a favorable image.  
A. FINDINGS 
The results from the case study on drone strikes in Pakistan suggest that drone 
strikes result in an overall increased salience of “America” tweets. This salience of 
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“America” tweets continues even after one month following a drone strike. Further 
analysis demonstrated that there is strong correlation between drone strikes in Pakistan 
and “negative America” tweets, even after controlling for the total number of “America” 
tweets and the number of tweets per city. This phenomenon occurs in the day 
immediately following a drone strike and gets even more statistically significant seven 
days following a drone strike. Anti-American sentiment, as evidenced through the 
Pakistani Twittersphere, rises with the advent of a drone strike despite the intent of the 
United States, despite the number of terrorists killed, despite the U.S.-Pakistani alliance, 
and despite the attempts of the Pakistani government to inform the populace of the 
underlying motives.  
The data from the case study on U.S.-Japanese joint exercises reveals that an 
increased salience of “America” tweets appears in the Japanese Twittersphere seven days 
following an exercise and then drops off after 30 days. Further, it found a strong 
relationship between the occurrence of an exercise and the number of “negative America” 
tweets. After 30 days, the salience of “America” tweets dies off, but more pointed tweets 
surface with heightened negative and positive sentiment. 30 days following an exercise, 
the populace has been given time to digest what has occurred and opinions are now being 
formulated as to whether this was beneficial or not. 
When these joint exercises occur on Japanese soil, the number of “negative 
America” tweets increases immediately following an exercise and then significantly 
decreases after the 30-day period following the exercise start. Whether this occurs due to 
increased noise, increased traffic, or increased number of incidents in the local 
community, “negative America” tweets by Japanese locals increase the longer it has been 
since the exercise started. Regardless of the duration of an exercise, the initial benefit that 
the community might appreciate in the beginning can soon turn sour as the Japanese 
dwell on the fact that America still has a heavy hand over them with limitations on their 
military power.  
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B. LESSONS LEARNED 
In general, America needs to be more transparent with its goals and intentions 
when using military power, or at a minimum be more circumspect about the use of that 
power. America has to assure the people of Pakistan that drone strikes are well 
researched, isolated, and intended to bolster the safety of both nations in the long run, 
despite occasional civilian casualties. In Japan, the United States stands to gain respect by 
broadcasting its intentions for engaging in large military exercises that involve Japanese 
troops and an increased presence of U.S. military. Without this information, the Japanese 
could feel mistreated and walked upon by a foreign country that has chipped away at 
their military sovereignty for over 50 years.  
This thesis explored the pros and cons of using social media as a means for 
gathering actionable intelligence on possible hostile social environments with the 
ultimate goal of winning the information game. If the U.S. government can observe signs 
of social unrest based on Twitter analysis than it consequently preempt harrowing 
situations from affecting U.S. troops around the world. I conclude that the argument in 
favor of web analytics and social media scraping holds more weight than not, and we are 
only in the nascent stages of extracting gold from the Twittersphere. Defining Twitter 
sentiment queries is not without its difficulties but can ultimately prove insightful into a 
nation’s inner thoughts. In the words of John Arquilla, who has spent more than two 
decades of his life studying the advantages of small-unit tactics and successful 
counterinsurgency operations, “it is high time to develop a willingness to amend and 
adjust military strategies based on concerns raised by insights from information 
strategy.”200  
                                                 
200 Arquilla, “The End of War as We Knew It,” 383. 
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